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ABSTRACT 
A new gender wage gap decomposition methodology is introduced that does not suffer from 
the identification problem caused by unobserved non-discriminatory wage structure.  The  
methodology is used to measure the relative size of Korean gender wage gaps from 1994 to 
2000 across industries, differentiated by industrial knowledge intensity, where knowledge 
intensity is the extent to which industries produce or employ high-technology products.  Korea 
represents an important case study, since it possesses one of the fastest growing knowledge-
intensive economies, among industrialized countries.  Empirical results indicate that over this 
period, discrimination (the unexplained portion of the gender wage gaps) in Korea was 
statistically smaller in knowledge-intensive industries than in industries with low knowledge 
intensity.  Also, discrimination was declining on average over the period.  This suggests that 
continued growth in knowledge-intensive industries in Korea may lead to further declines in 
the overall gender gap. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: C12, J31, J71 
Keywords:  discrimination, labor markets, wage differential, compensation. 
 
 3
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Although there is an extensive body of literature on the decomposition of gender wage 
differentials, based on a single cross-section of data, there have been relatively few studies that 
analyze how these components evolve over time.  For example, see Blau and Kahn (1999).  In 
the last few years, many developing countries have undergone substantial changes in their 
industrial compositions and market structures, due to development strategies, shifting trade 
policies, and sectoral shifts in the global economy (Freeman, 2004). Therefore, a dynamic 
analysis of the evolution of the gender wage gap in a developing country seems particularly 
relevant.  In particular, developing countries in Asia experienced a substantial shift towards 
knowledge-intensive industries at the end of the last decade (OECD, 2000), where knowledge-
intensity is measured as the extent to which industries utilize a skilled or educated workforce or 
the extent to which technologically advanced processes are used in the production of output.   
An interesting question is then, "are these 'knowledge based' industries more or less 
prone to gender discrimination than 'non-knowledge based' industries?" A second interesting 
question is, "to what extent has this shift towards knowledge based industries been 
accompanied with a change in the prevalence of gender discrimination in Asian economies?"  
In this study, we analyze inter-industry gender wage gaps by knowledge intensity in Korea, 
using a cross sectional occupational wage survey between the years 1994 and 2000. The 
Korean economy provides a good test case, as the transition towards knowledge based 
industries in this country was substantial (OECD, 2000).  Also, Korea experienced a steady 
decrease in the overall female-male wage differentials.1  We find that in each year considered, 
Korean knowledge based industries were less discriminatory than non-knowledge based 
                                                 
1 For non-agricultural industries, the average female-to-male earnings ratio was 44.2% in 1980 but was 63.2% in 
2000 (Korean Labor Institute, Labor Statistics, 2004).  
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industries in terms of pay differentials.  We also find that the decrease the in the overall wage 
gap was accompanied by a decrease in the discriminatory (unexplained) portion of the gap. 
 To analyze inter-industry wage differentials by knowledge intensity, we identify a new 
decomposition methodology that allows us to make relative comparisons across industries and 
across time.  Conventional decomposition techniques (Oaxaca 1972, and Blinder, 1973) are not 
identified in the sense that the investigator must decide a priori on an appropriate measure of 
the unobserved non-discriminatory wage structure (Neumark, 1988).  Our method identifies 
relative inter-industry gender wage gaps and does not require an ad hoc proxy for the non-
discriminatory wage structure, because the estimation is designed to eliminate this structure, 
when it can be assumed to be fixed across industries and across time.  Our estimates reveal that 
gender discrimination in "knowledge based" industries was significantly lower than in "non-
knowledge based" industries in Korea in all years considered. The results hold for knowledge 
based industries within both the manufacturing and service sectors of the Korean economy, as 
well as for the economy as a whole. Our analysis reveals that dynamic fluctuations of 
discrimination in the manufacturing sector at the end of the millennium were consistent with 
the timing of the Asian financial crisis, and it may be possible that gender discrimination 
improved during a period of intense industrial competition.  While this is not formally 
investigated or tested, it is consistent with the arguments of Becker (1971). 
 The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes theories that link 
industrial composition and knowledge intensity to the magnitude of the unexplained gender 
wage gap.  In Section III, we develop a relative estimation strategy to estimate inter-industry 
"non-discriminatory percentages", our normalized measure of gender discrimination.  Our 
strategy does not suffer from the lack of identification described by Neumark (1988).  Section 
IV describes the survey data used in this study, as well as the classification of industries into 
"knowledge based" and "non-knowledge based" categories. Section V presents the empirical 
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results and compares the components of inter-industry wage differentials in knowledge based 
industries with non-knowledge based industries. We repeat the analysis at a more 
disaggregated level and compare the manufacturing sector and service sector by their 
knowledge intensity. The final section summarizes and concludes.     
 
 
 
II. INDUSTRIAL COMPOSITION AND GENDER WAGE GAPS     
 
Krueger and Summers (1988) refueled an empirical and theoretical debate about the causes of 
gender wage differentials.  They found that the structure of the wage in the United States was 
not compatible with a neoclassical model (Edin and Zetteberg, 1992), showing that inter-
industry gender wage disparities persisted between workers with identical individual 
characteristics and working conditions.  Several other studies, using standard wage regressions, 
also support the existence of inter-industry gender wage differentials for apparently equally 
skilled workers; many of these studies conclude that gender discrimination cannot be refuted.  
See Gibbons and Katz (1992), Helwege (1992), Fields and Wolff (1995), and Abowd, 
Karamarz, Margolis (1999).2  In the last decade, many developing countries experienced 
changes in industrial composition due to development strategies, trade liberalization, and 
global economic shifts (OECD, 2000).  If the level of gender discrimination is different (lower) 
in industries that are experiencing higher growth rates relative to other industries, then a 
change (decrease) in the economies overall gender gap may accompany these changes in the 
industrial composition (ceteris paribus).  
 There are several reasons why we might expect different levels of gender 
discrimination in different industries.  First, productivity of labor in some industries is an 
increasing function of physical power for which the female labor force has comparative and 
                                                 
2  It is not our intent to argue the validity of wage regression for decomposing wage differentials, because they 
clearly have their drawbacks.  However, they have been and continue to be a fairly standard tool in the literature. 
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absolute disadvantage.  Other things being equal, it is natural to expect higher gender wage 
disparities in these industries relative to the industries that do not require physical strength. 
Clearly, this is an argument for a marginal product differential, but these differences may push 
employers in these industries towards discriminatory tastes.  Second, there are substantial 
differences in the degree of competition in different industries due to differences in product 
and labor markets, government regulations, and trade policies.  Becker (1971) claims that 
increasing competition results in lower levels of discrimination, which would cause inter-
industry differences in the wage gaps.  Finally, given today's globalization of markets, 
industries that are export-oriented (and not global monopolies) may be less likely to 
discriminate in their long-run labor practices, as competition in international market precludes 
survival of firms with inefficient (discriminatory) labor market practices.   
Melitz (2003) develops a dynamic model to analyze the intra-industry effects of 
international trade.  In this model, exposure to trade causes only the most productive firms to 
survive within an industry.  There is also a large empirical literature showing that exposure to 
trade increases the overall level of productivity in an industry through the mechanism 
described above.  In the classic Becker (1971) model, a firm (employer) that has tastes for 
discrimination will employ fewer than the profit maximizing number of female employees, and 
consequently will achieve suboptimal profits.  We expect that market mechanism would force 
firms with tastes for discrimination to exit the market, causing the overall level of 
discrimination to be lower in export-oriented industries relative to industries that trade 
domestically.  Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (2002) test whether competitive market forces 
reduce or eliminate discrimination using plant level longitudinal data.  They find a positive 
relationship between firm-level profitability and the proportion of female labor force.  They 
also find evidence that among plants with high market power, those that employ a relatively 
large female labor force are more profitable, whereas no such relationship exist for plants with 
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low market power.  The results are consistent with the short-run implications of Becker’s 
model of employer discrimination.   
 There is also a class of models that posit differential employment search costs as 
support for the existence of employer discrimination.  Black (1995) constructs a model that 
supports employer discrimination when sequential search costs are considered.  In this model, 
prejudiced employers only hire majority workers, whereas unprejudiced employers hire both 
majority and minority workers.  Since job search costs are higher for minority workers, they 
lower their reservation wage, creating a wage differential between majority and minority 
workers.  Black's model also predicts that as the fraction of unprejudiced firms increases, the 
wage differential vanishes, because search cost are effectively reduced for minority workers.    
Therefore, if discrimination is different (lower) on average in developed counties than in 
developing countries (for a variety of reasons that will not be discussed here), then a shift 
towards trade liberalization and a global economy would (change) decrease wage differentials 
in developing economies on average (ceteris paribus). 
 If there are differences between industries in terms of discriminatory practices, then the 
evolution of gender wage gaps may be partially correlated with the changes in the industrial 
structure of the countries, holding worker characteristics constant.  Insofar as knowledge based 
industries are less capital intensive and more human capital intensive, they may exhibit smaller 
(physical) capital barriers to entry and higher potential long-run competition than non-
knowledge based industries. Assuming the existence of discrimination, as an economy shifts 
towards more knowledge based and (potentially) more competitive industries, the overall level 
of gender wage gaps should decrease even when male-female characteristics are unchanged.  
In this study, we identify and estimate a decomposition of inter-industry gender wage gaps by 
knowledge intensity in Korea, a country that experienced a large transition to knowledge based 
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industries in the last three decades.3  Korea is also an extreme example of rapid improvement 
in the overall gender wage gaps, although gender wage gaps in Korea are still larger than most 
OECD countries. Figure 1 shows the evolution of female-to-male ratio of earnings between 
1980 and 2000.  For non-agricultural industries, the female-to-male earnings ratio in Korea had 
increased monotonically and fast, from 44.2% in 1980 and 63.7% in 1998, and leveled off 
between 1998 and 2000. This continuous improvement in the earnings ratio is associated with 
an improvement in discrimination (or the unexplained portion of the usual average wage gap).  
Our results indicate that there appears to be a strong correlation between a transition towards 
knowledge based industries and a decrease in gender discrimination in Korea at the end of the 
millennium. 
 
III. DECOMPOSITION FRAMEWORK 
The classic Oaxaca-Blinder wage decomposition attempts to quantify gender discrimination in 
a highly stylized Becker (1971) model (See Oaxaca, 1973 or Blinder, 1973).  This 
decomposition hinges on perfectly competitive labor markets where workers with the same 
skills earn the same wage everywhere.  That is, there exists some non-discriminatory wage 
structure vector, θ , that maps the demographic attributes (including education, age, and 
experience) of a worker into a wage, regardless of industry, occupation, or human capital 
investment.4  Empirical implementations posit that if worker i possess demographic 
characteristic vector, ix , then the worker should be paid a non-discriminatory wage, θii xy = , 
where the wage is typically in logarithmic form.  Then, gender discrimination can be 
quantified, in part, as deviations of observed male and female wage structures from the 
unobserved or hypothetical standard, θ .   
                                                 
3 For years from 1990 to 2000, for instance, the growth of real value-added of the Korean economy was mainly 
led by knowledge based manufacturing, while employment growth mainly led by knowledge based services. For 
details, see Jung and Choi (2006). 
4  In what follows, we effectively assume that this non-discriminatory structure is constant over time, as well. 
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While much has been written on the estimation of the male and female wage structures 
using regression, little has been written on the estimation of θ  to which the estimated 
structures are to be compared, in order to quantify discrimination.  The Oaxaca-Blinder 
procedure proceeds by substituting either the estimated male wage structure or the estimated 
female wage structure for θ  to calculate discrimination.  According to Neumark (1988), 
substituting the estimated male wage structure implies the additional assumption that males are 
paid their marginal product, while substituting the estimated female wage structure implies that 
females are paid their marginal product.  The choice of which estimate structure to use for the 
unobserved non-discriminatory structure, θ , has implications for the measurement of 
discrimination. An extreme example of this range is Ferber and Greene (1982), where wage 
discrimination for a sample of university professors was 2 percent, based on the male non-
discriminatory wage structure, and was 70 percent, based on the female non-discriminatory 
wage structure.  It is in this sense that these estimates are not identified.  Neumark suggests an 
alternative estimator for θ  based on a regression that pools male and female observations in 
the sample.  The technique presented here use differences in counterfactual wage estimates to 
produce measures of relative discrimination that are no longer a function of θ , so no arbitrary 
decision on which structure to choose is eliminated.  It is in this sense that our estimates are 
identified. 
The goals here are: a) to partition a Korean labor market data set by year and industry, 
where industries can be categorized as either "knowledge based" or non-knowledge based" and 
b) to estimate gender wage gaps over time and industry type to determine if gender wage gaps 
have been statistically declining over time, and if their decline is in anyway related to 
knowledge intensity.   These estimates are calculated at various levels of aggregation in the 
data.  The next subsection details estimation strategies at each level of aggregation considered.  
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A. Estimation of wage gaps 
Let   Kk ,...,1=  index industries at different levels of aggregation (e.g., knowledge based and 
non-knowledge based, or hi-tech, medium hi-tech, medium lo-tech, and lo-tech 
manufacturing).  Let Tt ,...,1=  index time in years.  Consider the T×2  log-wage regressions. 
ft
K
k
ftkftkftftft dxy εβθ ++= ∑
=2
                                                   (1) 
mt
K
k
mtkmtkmtmtmt dxy εβθ ++= ∑
=2
                                                 (2) 
where fty  and mty  are  tF - and tM -dimensional column vectors, respectively, representing the 
log wage for female and males, respectively; ftx  and mtx  are )( gFt × and )( gM t × dimensional 
matrices, respectively, of observable explanatory variables; ftθ  and mtθ  are g-dimensional 
parameter vectors; ftkβ  and mtkβ  are scalar parameters; ftkd  and mtkd  are  tF - and tM -
dimensional vectors (respectively) of observable dummy variables for industry; and ftε  and 
mtε  are  tF - and tM -dimensional error vectors, respectively, satisfying the usual set of 
regression assumptions.  Define the following averages:  
ftF
t
ft xF
x
t
ι′= 1  )1( g×  and mtM
t
mt xM
x
t
ι′= 1  )1( g×  
where 
tF
ι  and 
tM
ι  are tF - and tM -dimensional column vectors of ones, respectively. These 
are average demographic characteristics in each year for females and males, respectively.  
Ordinary least squares yields KT ××2  predicted counterfactuals in each industry: 
ftkftftftk xy βθ ˆˆˆ += ,                                           (3) 
mtkmtmtmtk xy βθ ˆˆˆ += ,                                               (4)  
 where 0ˆˆ 11 == mtft ββ . 
 11
 These are counterfactuals in the sense that we use ftx  average female characteristics in 
year t for all industries (instead of average female characteristics in year t in industry k) to 
calculate ftkŷ .  This produces the predicted wage that an average female in year t would make 
if they were randomly placed in industry k.   The procedure is similar for calculating mtkŷ .  
This difference is essentially how identification is achieved.  Then, KT ×  decompositions of 
counterfactual male-female wage differences are: 
θθθθθββ )()}ˆ()ˆ()ˆˆ{(ˆˆ mtftmtmtftftmtkftkmtkftk xxxxyy −+−−−+−=−         (5) 
where θ  is some unobserved, non-discriminatory wage structure; it is the product of labor 
associated with a labor market that does not have tastes for discrimination.  This is similar to 
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition with one minor difference: the counterfactual male-female 
differential is decomposed and not the average male-female differential (say, mtft yy − ).  
Using the counterfactual seems reasonable, because the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
implicitly assumes that labor markets are competitive, and in this highly stylized world, labor 
should be readily substitutable across industries, particularly when it is the average laborer 
being substituted.  In what follows, we cannot solve or account for this particular shortcoming 
of the model.5 
A particularly appealing feature of this formulation of the decomposition is that 
equation (5) highlights the fact that the explained portion of the gap, θ)( mtft xx − , is not 
identified.  Therefore, the extent to which changes in the overall gap over t due to changes in 
average male-female characteristic differential, )( mtft xx − , is not estimable without knowing 
θ .  Therefore, even gender wage differences based on worker productivity differences are not 
measurable in the context of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.  This is important, because the 
                                                 
5  That is, we still must assume that θ  is constant over industries, and also over time. 
 12
decomposition is usually dichotomized into an "explained" and an "unexplained" portion, but 
without knowledge of θ , NOTHING is truly "explained."   
This may seem like a somewhat grim view of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, but 
the decomposition is salvageable (in some sense).  The problem is that the decomposition seeks 
to identify a dichotomy based on some "gold standard", θ , which assigns weights (or 
importance) to average worker characteristics.  However, if the gold standard is the same 
across industries (as these models typically assume), then we can use the variability over k to 
identify a relative measure of discrimination that is based on some male and female worker of 
average characteristics working in any industry k and being paid some economy-wide gold 
standard, θ . (This is the essence of the identifying assumption.)  Based on equation (5), 
discrimination (the bracketed potion of the counterfactual wage decomposition in the equation) 
is: 
)}ˆ()ˆ()ˆˆ{(),,(ˆ θθθθββθδ −−−+−= mtmtftftmtkftkmtfttk xxxx                  (6) 
which is also not identified, since θ  is not identified. Let ),,(ˆmax),,(ˆ ][ mtfttkkmtftkt xxxx θδθδ = .  
Notice that because of the linearity (monotonicity) of the decomposition, it doesn't matter what 
we use for θ  to find the index of the maximum, ][k .  The magnitude of ),,(ˆ ][ mtftkt xxθδ  is a 
function if θ , but the index of the maximum, ][k , is the same regardless of what is selected 
forθ , because it is mapping into a set of characteristics, ftx  or mx  that doesn't vary over k.  
Therefore, selecting 0=θ  is fine for finding ][k , but mtθθ ˆ=  is what is normally used (men 
are paid the non-discriminatory standard, and women are paid below it).  Then differencing 
across k: 
),,(ˆ),,(ˆ),(ˆ ][ mtfttkmtftktmtfttk xxxxxx θδθδγ −=                                  (7) 
)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(),(ˆ ][][ mtkftkkmtkftmtfttk xx ββββγ −−−=                                   (8) 
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These are comparisons within years but between industries, and they sweep out the non-
discriminatory wage structure, θ , and are therefore identified.   Relative estimators of this type 
were first considered by Horrace and Oaxaca (2001).  Horrace (2005) explains that these 
measures are "relative to a within sample standard," and argues that the differencing may 
reduce estimation biases associated with non-zero means for ftε  and mtε . 
The measure in (8) identifies relative comparisons between industries while sweeping 
out θ  but (unfortunately) not between years, because the averages ftx  and mtx  are a function 
of t. To make comparisons between years and occupations, define the averages male and 
female characteristics across industries and years as fx  and mx .   Let 
∑
=
=
T
t
tFF
1
 and ∑
=
=
T
t
tMM
1
 
then grand means over all years and industries are  
∑
=
=
T
t
fttf xFF
x
1
1  )1( g×  and ∑
=
=
T
t
mttm xMM
x
1
1  )1( g×    
Plugging these values in for ftx  and mtx  in the previous analysis, we can difference across k 
and t.  Let  
)}ˆ()ˆ()ˆˆ{(),,(ˆ θθθθββθδ −−−+−= mtmftfmtkftkmftk xxxx                  (9) 
Let ),,(ˆmax),,(ˆ
,][ mftkktmftk
xxxx θδθδ = , so that 
),,(ˆ),,(ˆ),(ˆ ][ mftkmftkmftk xxxxxx θδθδγ −=      (10) 
and, 
)ˆˆ()ˆˆ()ˆˆ()ˆˆ(),(ˆ ][][][][ mttmmfttffmtkftktkmtkfmftk xxxx θθθθββββγ −−−+−−−=   (11)    
where ][tk  corresponds to the index of the maximal tkδ̂  for 0=θ  over both k  and t , and 
where ][t  corresponds to index of the same year associated with ][tk . These are comparisons 
 14
between years and industries, that sweep out θ , because the averages fx  and mx  are no longer 
a function of t .   
There is some industry in some year, ][tk , that possesses that maximal value of the 
unexplained counterfactual wage gap (discrimination): ][̂tkδ .  Then the difference, 0ˆ ≥tkγ , 
captures the (relative) extent to which industry k  in year t  is discriminatory.  A convenient 
normalization is the "non-discriminatory percentage" ]1,0(}~exp{ ∈− tkγ , Kk ,...,1= , Tt ,...,1= .   
The normalization can be interpreted as follows: "in a labor market where skill and the non-
discriminatory wage structure are constant over industry and time (save for the differentials 
ftkβ  and mtkβ ), industry-year ][tk  is 100 percent non-discriminatory relative to all industry-
years in the sample tk , and all other industry-years are some fraction (of 100 percent) non-
discriminatory."  Clearly, certain problems inherent in the classical Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition remain here.  For example, actual labor markets are marked with some level of 
heterogeneity across industries in terms of worker characteristics and (presumably) in terms of 
their non-discriminatory wage structures.  However, our measure does not suffer from the lack 
of identification embodied in an arbitrary selection of, say mtθθ ˆ= .  Also, there is truly no 
sense in which we have identified the "unexplained portion" of some observed wage gap, 
mtft yy − .  In fact we are decomposing the estimate mtkftk yy ˆˆ − , which is technically "not 
observed," so there is no way to relate our measure back to the overall gap, mtft yy − .   
However, this is the cost of the identification: everything is relative to the unidentified 
difference ),,(ˆ ][ mftk xxθδ , not the "identified" difference mtft yy − . 
The estimates in equation (11) are used in the empirical analyses that follow.  First, we 
partition the data into "knowledge-based industries" and "other industries", so that K = 2 (one 
dummy variable in each regression).  This produces two estimate of ),(ˆ mfkt xxγ  in each of 
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seven years, 2000,...,1994=t .  Then, we partition the data into four industries: knowledge-
based manufacturing, knowledge-based services, other manufacturing, and other services, so 
that K = 4 (three dummy variables in each regression).  This produces four estimates of 
),(ˆ mfkt xxγ  in each of seven years, 2000,...,1994=t .  We now discuss variance estimation for 
the estimates in equation (11). 
 
B. Variance-covariance estimation  
Since θ  will ultimately be eliminated by differencing, we set 0=θ  in what follows.  Hence, 
the estimator of interest is: 
)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(),,0(ˆ mtkmtmftkftfmftk xxxx βθβθδ +−+=                           (12) 
Let ]'ˆ,...,ˆ,ˆ[ˆ 2
*
ftKftftft ββθθ =  and ]'ˆ,...,ˆ,ˆ[ˆ 2
*
mtKmtmtmt ββθθ =  be  )1( −+ Kg  column vectors, so that 
]'ˆ,...,ˆ[ˆ **1
*
fTff θθθ =  and ]'ˆ,...,ˆ[ˆ
**
1
*
mTmm θθθ =  are )1( −+ KgT  column vectors.  Let  Q  be a 1−K  
identity matrix bordered above by a 1−K  row vector of zeros.  Therefore Q  is a )1( −× KK  
matrix.  Therefore, ],[ QxIC fKTf ⊗⊗= ι  and ],[ QxIC mKTm ⊗⊗= ι  are )1( −+× KgTTK  
matrices.  Then, 
**
)1(
ˆˆ),,0(ˆ mmff
TK
mf CCxx θθ −=Δ
×
                                            (13) 
is a TK  column vector, and is the vector representation of the estimates in equation (12), with 
typical element tkδ̂ .  Let D  be constructed from a ( 1)TK −  negative identity matrix with a 
column vector of ones inserted in ][tk  column position from the left and then a column of 
zeroes inserted in the ][tk  row position from the top.  For example if ][tk  is the second element 
of Δ̂ , then 
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is the vector representation of the ),(ˆ mftk xxγ  in equation (10).  Since the male and female 
samples are independent, 
']')ˆ(')ˆ([)},(ˆ{ ** DCVarCCVarCDxxVar mmmfff
TKTK
mf θθ +=Γ
×
                      (15) 
Treating the samples in each of the T regressions are independent, 
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a )1( −+ KgT  square matrix, where )ˆ( *ftVar θ  is a )1( −+ Kg  square matrix returned by any 
regression software package.  It follows similarly for )ˆ( *mtVar θ .  Also notice that θ  is a 
constant, so it is true that  
)},,0(ˆ{)},,(ˆ{
)(
mf
TKTK
mf xxVarxxVar Δ=Δ
×
θ                                      (16) 
Therefore, 
')ˆ(')ˆ()},,(ˆ{ ** mmmfffmf CVarCCVarCxxVar θθθ +=Δ     (17) 
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IV. DATA 
The data used for the empirical analysis are from the 1994 to 2000 Wage Structure Survey of 
the Ministry of Labor of Korea. The Survey provides information on personal characteristics 
and earnings data for workers employed in firms with 10 or more employees in all industries, 
except the public administration sector.6 For the empirical analysis, the agricultural and mining 
industries, as well as agricultural occupation, were excluded. The final data set includes about 
0.4 million workers for years 1994-1998, and about 0.5 million workers for 1999 and 2000. 
 The industrial classification for the empirical analysis is presented in Table 1. 
Knowledge based manufacturing sectors are classified based on their R&D intensity and 
knowledge-based service sectors are classified based on the ratio of college graduates. 
Knowledge-based manufacturing refers to high-technology manufacturing in areas such as 
electronics and communication equipment, and also to medium-high-technology 
manufacturing in areas such as computers and motor vehicles. Other manufacturing includes 
medium-low-technology manufacturing covering chemicals, rubber and plastic products, 
metals, and also low-technology manufacturing ranging from food and textiles to paper 
products. Knowledge-based services include communications, finance, business services, 
health, education, and cultural services. Non-knowledge based services or "other services" 
include the industries like utilities, construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and 
restaurants, and transport and storage. These industrial groupings were made based upon the 
two-digit Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC). 
 
V. RESULTS 
In order to estimate non-discriminatory percentages for industry groups, wage regressions for 
male and female groups were estimated for years 1994 to 2000.  The first set of regressions 
                                                 
6 The Survey was extended to newly include small firms with 5-9 employees since 1999, but workers employed in 
firms with 5-9 employees were excluded from the final data set for consistency.  
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included dummy variables for whether an individual was employed in a knowledge based 
industry or not.  Estimation results of these regressions are presented in Table 3.  As an 
estimator of equation  (11), we report two values ( 2,1=k ; knowledge and non-knowledge 
based) of the "non-discriminatory percentages," }ˆexp{ tkγ− , for seven years 7,...,1=t . The top 
section of Table 5 contains these values and the standard errors of the estimators.7  Here, the 
largest value of  4445.0ˆ ][ −=tkδ  corresponds to the knowledge based industries in 1999.
8  
Thus, for knowledge based industries in 1999, 0ˆ =tkγ  and 1}ˆexp{ =− tkγ , so in 1999 
knowledge based industries were "100 percent non-discriminatory," meaning that, relatively 
speaking, knowledge based industries in 1999 were the least discriminatory industry-year in 
the sample.  All other industry-years are evaluated relative to this standard.   
 Table 5 shows that, in 1994 knowledge based industries were 93.8 percent non-
discriminatory and non-knowledge based industries were 90.7 percent non-discriminatory. In 
2000, knowledge based industries were 98.4 percent nondiscriminatory and non-knowledge 
based industries were 96.2 percent non-discriminatory. Figure 2 shows the values of non-
discriminatory percentages as well as 95 percent confidence intervals based on the standard 
errors in equation (17). According to our estimation, knowledge based industries had 
significantly higher non-discriminatory percentages in all years considered. Although in 1996 
the two estimates were relatively close, the difference was still significant based on the 95 
percent confidence intervals. The non-discriminatory percentages in two groups of industries 
follow a different trend between 1994 and 2000.  Non-knowledge based industries or "other 
industries" (the solid line) show a relatively fast improvement between 1994 and 1996, 
                                                 
7  Note that the standard errors are for tkγ̂  not the normalization }ˆexp{ tkγ− , but they can be used to calculate 
confidence intervals on the }ˆexp{ tkγ− , since it is a monotonic transformation of tkγ̂ .  We do this in the sequel. 
8  Note that 4445.0ˆ ][ −=tkδ  is not readily interpretable as a measure of discrimination, because it is evaluated at 
0=θ . 
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followed by a relatively steady three years and a significant improvement in 2000. Knowledge 
based industries (the dashed line), however, follow a different pattern. Between 1994 and 1996 
non-discrimination improved very slightly, followed by a large improvement in 1997 and an 
insignificant decline in 1998. In 1999, knowledge based industries have the largest non-
discriminatory percentage (100 percent), but it decreased to 98.4 percent in 2000. 
 There is a strong possibility that we are picking up the effects of the Asian Financial 
Crisis that occurred between 1997 and 1998. This may be particularly true for knowledge 
based manufacturing industries in Korea, which experienced very strong growth immediately 
before the financial crisis.  The OECD (2000) report characterizes Asian economies before the 
financial crisis as “industrial over-capacity due to excessive investment in manufacturing”.  
The rapid increase in the non-discriminatory percentages for knowledge based industries 
between 1996 and 1997 may be correlated with this over-capitalization in Asian manufacturing 
and the subsequent steep decline in Asian currencies after the crisis. It is not clear what 
mechanism produced this apparent correlation, nor are we willing to speculate on it, since it is 
beyond the scope of this research.  However, the coincidence of the decrease in the 
unexplained portion in the gender wage in Korean knowledge based industries and the Asian 
financial crisis is too pronounced in Figure 2 to be ignored. In the next analysis, we will show 
that the changes in discrimination for knowledge based industries were, in fact, substantial in 
the manufacturing sector, but weak or non-existent in the service sector.     
 To disaggregate the industry effects, we re-estimated the regressions with three industry 
dummies representing the knowledge based manufacturing, knowledge based services, non-
knowledge based manufacturing (other manufacturing), and the non-knowledge based services 
(other services) as the omitted category. The regression results are tabulated in Table 4. 
Normalized estimates of equation (11) can be found in Table 5.  Figures 3 and 4 show the 
evolution of non-discriminatory percentages for these four industry classifications. Lower and 
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upper limits of confidence intervals (based on standard errors reported in Table 5) show that 
the non-discriminatory percentages were significantly higher in knowledge based industries for 
both manufacturing and services.  
   The empirical finding that non-discriminatory percentages are significantly higher in 
knowledge based industries is consistent with the hypothesis that non-productivity related 
discrimination in knowledge based industries is more costly than in non-knowledge based 
industries. That is, non-productivity related discrimination is perhaps more detrimental to the 
competitiveness of knowledge based industries than non-knowledge based industries, where 
the former is heavily dependent upon knowledge inputs, and perhaps subject to higher degree 
of competition.  Notice, also, that non-discriminatory percentages are higher in services than in 
manufacturing. Non-discriminatory percentages in non-knowledge based services are lower 
than those in knowledge based services and are higher than those in both knowledge based and 
non-knowledge based manufacturing. These differences, perhaps, reinforce the argument that 
gender discrimination is likely to be larger in sectors that require more physical power, where 
female workers have a comparative disadvantage. Also, the difference in non-discriminatory 
percentages between knowledge based sectors and non-knowledge based sectors is smaller for 
manufacturing than for services. 
 Again, there seems to be some (unexplained) correlation between the steep increases in 
the non-discriminatory percentages in the manufacturing sector (Figure 4) and the Asian 
Financial Crisis that occurred between 1997 and 1998. In Figure 4, we see a significant drop in 
1999 knowledge based manufacturing industries, as well as in non-knowledge based industries. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze effects of the Asian crisis on Korean 
labor markets, it is interesting to see that the improvements in non-discriminatory percentages 
between 1994 and 1998 were partially reversed in knowledge based manufacturing industries 
and completely reversed in non-knowledge based manufacturing industries as the financial 
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crisis was mitigated. In 2000, there was a significant improvement in non-knowledge based 
industries and a slight decrease in knowledge based industries. Figure 3 shows that, in the 
service sector, the correlation between the financial crisis and gender discrimination was so 
clear as in the manufacturing sector. In 1998, there was a slight decrease in non-discriminatory 
percentages in non-knowledge based services, followed by a significant improvement. In 
knowledge based service industries, however, there was a slight decrease in the trend, followed 
by a significant improvement. In 2000, both knowledge and non-knowledge based service 
industries experienced a fall in terms of non-discriminatory percentages.  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
If one accepts the validity of Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions from linear wage regressions 
then the counterfactual decomposition presented herein is identified, while the usual 
decomposition is not.  Our technique also readily lends itself to comparisons across separate 
regression periods and to a convenient normalization of discrimination to percentages on the 
unit interval.  We have also provided an explanation of how to calculate standard errors for our 
estimates.  Our technique could be applied to any partition of the data (not just a partition 
based on knowledge intensity) and to other forms of discrimination (e.g., discrimination by 
race), as well. 
 Our application suggests that discrimination was smaller in knowledge intensive 
industries in Korea than in non-knowledge intensive industries at the end of the last decade, 
and this difference seems to have been most pronounced in the manufacturing sector.  In 
absolute terms we do not know the difference and by how much it changed over time; this is 
the cost of the relative estimation procedure.  There was some volatility in the level of 
discrimination around the time of the Asian Financial Crisis, particularly in the manufacturing 
sector.  Despite this volatility, discrimination declined on average over the seven-year period.  
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It would be interesting to explore the nature of the causality (if any) between the overall 
decline in discrimination and the events surrounding the Asian Financial crisis, but this is left 
for future research. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Female-to-Male Ratio of Average Earnings 
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  Source: Korean Labor Institute, Labor Statistics (2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Non-Discriminatory Percentages, Knowledge Based Industries and Other Industries 
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Figure plots }ˆexp{ tkγ−  where tkγ̂  is based on equation (11). 
[tk] = [Knowledge Based Industries, 1999].  95% confidence bounds. 
Other Industries = Non-Knowledge Based Industries. 
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Figure 3: Non-Discriminatory Percentages, Knowledge Based Services and Other  Service 
 
0.8000
0.8500
0.9000
0.9500
1.0000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Know ledge Based Services Other Services
 
Figure plots }ˆexp{ tkγ−  where tkγ̂  is based on equation (11). 
[tk] = [Knowledge Based Services, 1999].  95% confidence bounds. 
Other Services = Non-Knowledge Based Services. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Non-Discriminatory Percentages, Knowledge Based Manufacturing and Other 
Manufacturing 
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Figure plots }ˆexp{ tkγ−  where tkγ̂  is based on equation (11). 
[tk] = [Knowledge Based Services, 1999].  95% confidence bounds. 
Other Manufacturing = Non-Knowledge Based Manufacturing. 
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Table 1: Classification of Knowledge Based Industries 
      
R&D 
Intensity1 
(1999) 
College 
Graduates2 
(2001) 
 Knowledge- High-tech Electronical machinery 10.6 16.8
 based   Communication equipment 17.9 19.8
 Manufacturing 
 (KBM)  Medium-high-tech Office/accounting/computing machinery  7.0 17.0
    Motor vehicles 8.9 11.8
 Other   Medium-low- Chemicals 3.6 29.6
 Manufacturing  tech Rubber/plastic products 3.5 12.1
 (OM)   Non-metallic mineral products 1.9 11.5
    Metals 1.0 13.6
    Fabricated metal products 1.0 8.9
    Non-electrical machinery 3.6 11.5
    Precision instruments 4.1 8.9
    Other transport equipment 1.1 26.5
    Furniture, and Manufacturing n.e.c. 1.6 10.2
   Low-tech Food, beverages, tobacco 0.7 10.0
    Textiles, apparel, leather 0.9 6.7
    Wood and paper products 0.5 3 14.1
    Printing - 29.0
    Petroleum refineries/products 0.5 44.7
    Recycling - 3.8
 Knowledge- Communications - 29.2
 based Financial services - 31.0
 Services Business services - 35.2
 (KBS)  Education services  - 59.5
  Health services/social work - 31.2
  Culture/recreation - 23.3
 Other  Electricity, gas, water supply - 30.7
 Services  Construction - 13.2
 (OS) Wholesale/retail trade - 15.4
  Hotels and restaurants - 4.7
  Transport and storage - 10.9
  Real estate activities - 15.0
  Other services - 18.7
All Industries 1.8 19.0
 
Notes: 1) R&D expenditures as a percentage of value added in each industry. 
           2) The ratio of 4-year college graduates to the total employed(%). 
           3) Includes printing industry. 
 
Sources:  OECD(2002), Science, Technology and Industry Outlook,  
                NSO, Korea(2002), The Economically Active Population Survey.  
 
 
 
 
                
      Table 2: Descriptive Statistics* 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
              
Logarithm of Hourly Wage (Won) 8.00 8.55 8.16 8.68 8.34 8.84 8.44 8.92 8.45 8.93 8.46 8.90 8.59 9.02 
 (0.44) (0.49) (0.45) (0.49) (0.46) (0.52) (0.47) (0.51) (0.48) (0.52) (0.52) (0.54) (0.52) (0.55) 
Age 30.72 36.39 30.92 36.67 31.39 36.69 31.96 37.21 32.12 37.61 32.14 37.48 32.68 37.82 
 (11.57) (9.95) (11.67) (10.06) (11.69) (10.27) (11.70) (10.33) (11.46) (10.03) (11.09) (9.87) (11.06) (10.00)
Married 0.43 0.76 0.43 0.76 0.44 0.74 0.47 0.76 0.47 0.78 0.49 0.76 0.49 0.75 
 (0.49) (0.43) (0.50) (0.43) (0.50) (0.44) (0.50) (0.43) (0.50) (0.42) (0.50) (0.43) (0.50) (0.43) 
Tenure 3.48 5.94 3.79 6.33 3.66 5.99 3.92 6.25 4.27 6.74 4.33 6.64 4.22 6.68 
 (3.67) (5.73) (3.89) (6.02) (4.03) (6.06) (4.21) (6.13) (4.35) (6.29) (4.34) (6.24) (4.47) (6.45) 
               
Education:               
Less Than High School 0.32 0.21 0.30 0.19 0.28 0.17 0.26 0.16 0.23 0.14 0.21 0.14 0.20 0.14 
 (0.47) (0.41) (0.46) (0.39) (0.45) (0.37) (0.44) (0.37) (0.42) (0.35) (0.41) (0.35) (0.40) (0.35) 
High School  0.54 0.48 0.54 0.48 0.53 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.51 0.45 0.48 0.45 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Two-Year College  0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.12 
 (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.29) (0.32) (0.30) (0.35) (0.31) (0.35) (0.32) (0.37) (0.32) 
Four-Year College or above 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.24 0.09 0.26 0.10 0.26 0.12 0.28 0.14 0.30 0.15 0.29 
 (0.24) (0.42) (0.26) (0.43) (0.29) (0.44) (0.30) (0.44) (0.32) (0.45) (0.35) (0.46) (0.36) (0.45) 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, con’t * 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
              
Establishment Size:               
10-29 Employees 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.25 0.30 0.27 
 (0.42) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.43) (0.42) (0.44) (0.42) (0.44) (0.42) (0.46) (0.43) (0.46) (0.45)
30-99 Employees 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.25 0.31 0.27 
 (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.43) (0.46) (0.44)
100-299 Employees 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.21 
 (0.40) (0.41) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41) (0.39) (0.41) (0.38) (0.40)
300-499 Employees 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
500+ Employees 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.15 0.19 
 (0.41) (0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.41) (0.43) (0.40) (0.42) (0.40) (0.42) (0.38) (0.42) (0.36) (0.39)
               
Industries**:                
Knowledge Based Industries 0.37 0.28 0.40 0.30 0.43 0.32 0.45 0.33 0.48 0.36 0.47 0.34 0.48 0.33 
 (0.48) (0.45) (0.49) (0.46) (0.49) (0.47) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.47)
Knowledge Based Manufacturing 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 
 (0.33) (0.30) (0.35) (0.31) (0.34) (0.32) (0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32)
Knowledge Based Services 0.25 0.18 0.26 0.19 0.29 0.21 0.32 0.22 0.36 0.24 0.36 0.23 0.36 0.21 
 (0.43) (0.39) (0.44) (0.39) (0.46) (0.41) (0.46) (0.41) (0.48) (0.43) (0.48) (0.42) (0.48) (0.41)
               
                    
                               *   The values in parenthesis correspond to standard deviations of the variables.  
  ** Refer to Table 1 for classification of the industries. 
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        Table 3: Regression Results – Two Industry Dummies, Dependent Variable: Logarithm of hourly wage in Korean Won. * 
 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
(Constant) 7.14 6.92 7.34 6.98 7.39 7.12 7.51 7.23 7.53 7.13 7.51 6.74 7.65 6.80 
 [2337.02] [2476.09] [2412.69] [2583.62] [2348.87] [2571.38] [2335.75] [2603.06] [2138.41] [2364.39] [1935.69] [2086.14] [2033.06] [2120.42] 
Age 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 
 [121.12] [347.97] [99.56] [367.00] [132.90] [353.28] [116.15] [348.16] [103.75] [336.23] [69.86] [434.96] [75.26] [432.26] 
Age-squared -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 
 [-135.54] [-334.08] [-117.69] [-347.82] [-153.49] [-337.90] [-137.62] [-329.02] [-130.46] [-314.91] [-83.03] [-421.37] [-94.49] [-405.52] 
High School 0.24 0.17 0.26 0.19 0.26 0.21 0.27 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.32 0.19 0.28 0.21 
 [320.95] [334.23] [342.83] [378.20] [322.84] [379.19] [324.32] [367.50] [249.69] [320.51] [303.29] [280.44] [280.49] [308.73] 
2-year college  0.39 0.29 0.41 0.32 0.40 0.35 0.42 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.44 0.32 0.42 0.35 
 [339.77] [374.53] [384.21] [437.54] [367.68] [450.72] [380.86] [468.73] [318.14] [428.95] [340.62] [363.31] [345.92] [404.66] 
4-year college + 0.66 0.53 0.66 0.56 0.69 0.59 0.70 0.60 0.65 0.57 0.71 0.58 0.70 0.61 
 [554.29] [908.09] [604.69] [992.26] [633.73] [963.95] [632.70] [960.08] [553.95] [865.10] [567.89] [797.49] [583.15] [846.72] 
30-99 employees -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 [-26.63] [-86.35] [-54.55] [-92.55] [-5.97] [-82.03] [-3.27] [-108.32] [-38.33] [-96.54] [14.02] [-5.71] [-6.38] [-16.12] 
100-299 employees -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 [-6.65] [-104.14] [3.06] [-99.46] [5.18] [-116.19] [27.98] [-127.19] [12.08] [-85.59] [30.09] [62.81] [39.15] [58.90] 
300-499 employees 0.03 -0.04 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.14 
 [28.49] [-46.74] [53.67] [11.02] [46.73] [21.18] [53.95] [-7.37] [49.82] [34.29] [31.73] [83.25] [70.45] [146.73] 
500+ employees  0.08 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.13 
 [100.26] [78.66] [100.51] [106.18] [161.89] [147.85] [180.53] [179.74] [154.85] [226.08] [135.32] [294.45] [122.82] [200.32] 
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 Table 3: Regression Results – Two Industry Dummies, con’t  
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Married -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.09 -0.01 0.10 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.08 
 [-8.59] [147.93] [0.02] [170.04] [-12.29] [170.22] [-26.71] [138.96] [-11.23] [125.39] [10.35] [114.26] [5.32] [123.49] 
Tenure-square -0.21 -0.11 -0.21 -0.10 -0.18 -0.10 -0.18 -0.09 -0.15 -0.09 -0.13 -0.06 -0.19 -0.11 
 [-241.88] [-260.47] [-258.77] [-284.97] [-226.39] [-276.53] [-238.63] [-253.33] [-185.61] [-244.43] [-153.27] [-148.77] [-214.62] [-258.30] 
Tenure 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.05 
 [573.86] [603.72] [616.85] [645.92] [564.96] [631.49] [575.51] [595.35] [514.08] [587.41] [462.27] [436.81] [540.87] [550.69] 
Knowledge-Based Industry 
 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.14 0.11 
 [216.71] [201.87] [186.69] [225.33] [193.65] [247.74] [224.18] [215.06] [235.26] [256.37] [247.97] [229.08] [219.94] [252.61] 
               
 
                 * t-values of the coefficients are presented in the brackets. 
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          Table 4: Regression Results – Four Industry Dummies, Dependent Variable: Logarithm of hourly wage in Korean Won.* 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
(Constant) 7.18 6.98 7.39 7.04 7.44 7.15 7.55 7.27 7.56 7.20 7.57 6.83 7.68 6.92 
 [2359.04] [2472.80] [2428.99] [2592.81] [2366.75] [2558.74] [2363.52] [2597.50] [2151.97] [2369.76] [1985.76] [2103.02] [2068.51] [2160.12] 
Age 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 
 [130.75] [336.08] [110.38] [352.87] [144.59] [345.43] [129.82] [337.59] [115.09] [319.83] [85.32] [420.34] [92.70] [413.64] 
Age-squared -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 
 [-147.29] [-324.80] [-130.76] [-336.52] [-167.90] [-331.95] [-153.95] [-321.26] [-143.48] [-302.21] [-99.80] [-411.73] [-112.51] [-392.97] 
High School 0.21 0.17 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.28 0.19 0.25 0.21 
 [286.39] [332.96] [303.14] [375.70] [288.32] [380.05] [294.25] [369.88] [230.90] [324.30] [271.33] [284.03] [256.16] [310.73] 
2-year college  0.32 0.28 0.35 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.34 
 [275.43] [367.87] [312.48] [430.88] [302.13] [444.88] [315.22] [460.95] [271.85] [421.19] [276.77] [355.63] [287.07] [389.20] 
4-year college + 0.60 0.52 0.60 0.54 0.63 0.58 0.63 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.62 0.56 0.62 0.58 
 [490.39] [881.14] [530.88] [960.91] [560.28] [938.41] [560.71] [931.09] [498.86] [838.14] [490.95] [767.28] [510.69] [804.39] 
30-99 employees -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 [-17.66] [-85.18] [-42.55] [-90.08] [7.38] [-79.98] [10.65] [-104.05] [-25.25] [-90.12] [35.53] [6.93] [14.15] [5.27] 
100-299 employees 0.01 -0.06 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
 [14.54] [-99.19] [22.37] [-91.52] [24.62] [-110.97] [45.26] [-119.94] [25.97] [-76.92] [62.77] [74.67] [69.58] [79.59] 
300-499 employees 0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.16 
 [41.67] [-42.21] [69.48] [20.30] [59.94] [26.24] [68.65] [0.07] [63.33] [47.27] [53.82] [99.20] [98.10] [173.67] 
500+ employees  0.11 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.17 
 [146.02] [107.57] [147.25] [148.92] [204.34] [167.07] [220.27] [209.81] [186.34] [266.18] [192.80] [332.29] [170.72] [266.82] 
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  Table 4: Regression Results – Four Industry Dummies, con’t * 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Married 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 -0.01 0.10 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.07 
 [-3.97] [147.67] [-2.46] [169.13] [-8.01] [170.98] [-21.75] [139.94] [-14.23] [125.74] [16.60] [114.44] [10.10] [121.34] 
Tenure-square -0.20 -0.11 -0.21 -0.11 -0.18 -0.11 -0.18 -0.10 -0.15 -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 -0.19 -0.11 
 [-242.42] [-270.47] [-264.70] [-297.14] [-227.00] [-282.28] [-242.73] [-263.69] [-188.02] [-259.72] [-151.54] [-161.47] [-212.36] [-271.52] 
Tenure 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.06 
 [560.45] [611.48] [613.28] [655.48] [556.93] [634.35] [574.00] [603.66] [511.48] [600.96] [451.92] [452.57] [528.48] [568.12] 
Knowledge Based Manufacturing -0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.05 
 [-51.60] [3.16] [-66.49] [-13.33] [-50.66] [70.60] [-37.89] [13.77] [-1.77] [-3.45] [-69.14] [-16.05] [-68.41] [-65.19] 
Knowledge Based Services 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.14 
 [179.05] [189.50] [130.31] [225.26] [135.48] [229.55] [155.10] [217.10] [168.98] [255.96] [165.78] [190.42] [156.28] [234.62] 
Other Manufacturing -0.07 -0.03 -0.09 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 -0.14 -0.06 -0.12 -0.08 
 [-92.74] [-64.86] [-124.97] [-73.34] [-114.49] [-21.20] [-121.97] [-39.65] [-89.84] [-59.68] [-160.91] [-122.59] [-137.01] [-161.57] 
               
 
                 * t-values of the coefficients are presented in the brackets. 
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Table 5: Non-Discriminatory Percentages 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
        
Two Industry Dummies:            
Knowledge Based Industries 0.938 0.939 0.945 0.974 0.973 1.000 0.984 
 (0.00081) (0.00079) (0.00079) (0.00079) (0.00080) (0.00000) (0.00084) 
        
Non – Knowledge Based Industries 0.907 0.930 0.941 0.940 0.942 0.944 0.962 
 (0.00073) (0.00072) (0.00073) (0.00074) (0.00076) (0.00080) (0.00078) 
        
Four Industry Dummies:         
Knowledge Based Manufacturing 0.771 0.793 0.820 0.828 0.844 0.801 0.800 
 (0.00119) (0.00113) (0.00116) (0.00117) (0.00123) (0.00136) (0.00127) 
        
Non-Knowledge Based Manufacturing 0.757 0.771 0.790 0.783 0.786 0.752 0.766 
 (0.00088) (0.00087) (0.00090) (0.00091) (0.00095) (0.00100) (0.00097) 
        
Knowledge Based Services 0.933 0.928 0.952 0.964 0.966 1.000 0.982 
 (0.00098) (0.00095) (0.00096) (0.00096) (0.00096) (0.00000) (0.00102) 
        
Non-Knowledge Based Services 0.811 0.842 0.860 0.859 0.847 0.869 0.863 
 (0.00100) (0.00097) (0.00098) (0.00098) (0.00101) (0.00104) (0.00105) 
        
                
Values are }ˆexp{ tkγ− ,. where tkγ̂  is based on equation (11).  Values in parentheses are t-states for  tkγ̂ , which are used to construct confidence intervals in Figures 3 – 5. 
 
